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Fresh upon graduating from law school in Cairo, two young men in their early twenties, Islam 
Yaken and his friend Mahmoud El Ghandour, pursued an unconventional career path. Yaken, 
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Abstract 
Radicalization amongst youth is a challenge facing the Arab world. Recent reports indicate 
that over 20,000 Arab fighters traveled to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria and another 5-15 
percent of millennials across seven Arab countries consider some violent extremist groups 
to be on the right path. In response, Arab countries have experimented with entertainment-
education (E-E) by using anti-extremism narratives in popular culture to address 
radicalization at the societal level. This study explores whether those narratives can elicit 
viewers’ parasocial interaction (PSI)—pseudo friendships with or animosity toward 
mediated personas that can catalyze persuasion—with fictional characters. Using 
qualitative and quantitative content analyses of more than 8,600 YouTube comments, this 
study explores Arab viewers’ responses to a recent E-E project, al-Siham al-Marika (The 
Piercing Arrows) drama series, that portrays life under ISIS’s control. The findings identify 
recurrent themes in the pool of comments, such as show debates, religious contestations, 
political disputes, empathy for victims, and engagement with plotline/characters. More 
importantly, they reveal at least one out of six comments (n=1477) exhibits PSI with 
fictional characters, addressing them as part of their social milieu. The study further traces 
the variations in the nature of PSI in relation to mediated positive role models, negative role 
models, and transitional characters in the narrative. It concludes with a discussion of E-E’s 
potentials as an anti-extremism messaging strategy and PSI’s role as a useful metric in 
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later deemed by international media as “the hipster jihadi,” had first travelled to join ISIS in 
2013, before Ghandour followed. The two came from middle class families, went to 
international schools, practiced sports, consumed popular culture, and produced their own 
entertainment content. They left behind an online repository that included workout episodes, 
an NSYNC music video remake, and a talk show about women (El-Naggar, 2015). As the duo 
performed their daily duties in ISIS’s ranks, they continued to produce entertainment content. 
Yaken’s 2014 fitness video in Syria dedicated to ISIS militants or their 2015 satirical video in 
Iraq refuting claims about Ghandour’s death are but two examples that convey the 
appropriation of entertainment in extremist messaging (Mehwar TV Channel, 2014; Zaki, 
2015). Whereas Yaken and Ghandour’s stories ended in their deaths, they have further added 
to the complexities involved in understanding radicalization and engagement in violent 
extremism.  
The two young men are among thousands of Arab youth who have joined militant 
groups over the past years. Yet, the number of fighters alone does not accurately reflect the 
level of radicalization in society. Scholars have developed various frameworks to explain the 
radicalization process (Borum, 2011; Horgan, 2005; Moghaddam, 2005; Moskalenko & 
McCauley, 2009; Precht, 2007; Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Victoroff, 2005), yielding a lack of 
consensus on a definitive model and prompting some to conceptualize radicalization as a 
puzzle (Hafez & Mullins, 2015). This study adopts Horgan’s definition of radicalization as 
“the social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist 
political or religious ideology” (Horgan, 2009, p. 152). As Horgan rightly argues, 
radicalization is only one risk factor that may or may not predict engagement in violence, and 
thus the cognitive and behavioral elements of extremism are quite distinct.  
Applied in context, Horgan’s insights reveal the need to recognize and respond to 
various points along the radicalization continuum. In the case of ISIS, for example, over 
21,000 Arab fighters immigrated to Iraq and Syria to engage in violent extremism, adding to 
local members who make up a sizable portion of the group’s rank and file (Barrett, 2017). But 
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countries perceive at least some of ISIS and al-Qaeda’s ideas and/or actions to be correct, 
while an alarming five to 15 percent in seven of those countries consider such groups on the 
right path (Tabah Foundation, 2016; Yunas et al., 2017). In a region ravaged with ongoing 
conflicts, radicalization amongst Arab youth can pose serious challenges. 
Consequently, Arab countries have used distinct approaches to address radicalization 
at the societal level. Targeting those who had disengaged from violence, Egypt facilitated in-
prison debates and the production of corrective literature by leaders and members of al-
Jama’a al-Islamiyya group (Ashour, 2009; Goerzig, 2019). Saudi Arabia taught critical 
thinking and other skills in deradicalization programs to ease re-entry into society (Horgan & 
Altier, 2012). Yemen, Algeria, and Morocco used a mixture of religious dialogue, 
reconciliation commissions, and/or clemency grants (Filali, 2019; Horgan & Braddock, 2010). 
To reach a broader segment of the population, however, the Arab world has also incorporated 
entertainment narratives as a potent tool for spreading anti-extremism messaging over the past 
two decades. Arab television stations have aired and produced anti-terror video campaigns, 
satirical shows, songs, films and drama series (Al-Rawi, 2013; Aly et al., 2014; Jaber & 
Kraidy, 2020; Khader, 2017; Lindsey, 2005; Navarro, 2019; Ratta, 2018; Stephan, 2015). 
Such content intends to spread pro-social messages and educate the public about the 
consequences of extremism in entertaining ways, a key feature of entertainment-education (E-
E) programming. Yet, anti-extremism narratives in the Arab world leave much of their impact 
open for speculation.  
This study attempts to fill this gap by exploring Arab viewers’ responses to a recent 
anti-extremism E-E project, al-Siham al-Marika (The Piercing Arrows) TV series, which 
portrays life under ISIS’s control. The study begins by conceptualizing the E-E framework as 
a narrative persuasion approach and reviewing the existing work on parasocial interaction 
(PSI), a construct that gauges viewers’ virtual relationships with mediated characters. It then 
lays out the methodology for analyzing the show’s content and viewer responses and 
highlights the main themes and viewer expressed interactions with the show’s characters 
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extremism messaging strategy and the role of PSI as a useful metric in assessing such 
narratives. 
 
Entertainment-Education (E-E) and Anti-Extremism Messaging 
 
The psychology of communication literature shows that narrative enhances the persuasive 
effect of messages, particularly when it comes to entertainment. Storytelling in television 
dramas and films can thus be a more attractive and subtle form of persuasion that reduces 
audience’s resistance (Nabi & Moyer-Guse, 2013). A range of concepts helps explain the 
underlying processes that involve the audience in the plot and with the characters. 
Transportation, for example, is when the viewer feels transported into the narrative, often 
losing the sense of bodily awareness, suspending reality, and experiencing real emotions that 
tend to reduce counterarguing (Green & Dill, 2013; Green & Brock, 2000). Identification is 
the merger between the self and the mediated character in the story (Cohen, 2009). In doing 
so, the individual discards their position as a viewer and adopts that of the character in the 
storyline. Constructs like presence (Lombard & Ditton, 1997), wishful identification (Giles, 
2002), homophily (Hoffner & Cantor, 1991), and parasocial interaction (Horton & Wohl, 
1956)—the latter to be discussed in more depth below—underscore additional symbolic 
interactions that bolster the educational potential of entertainment. 
E-E, which simply refers to the development and dissemination of prosocial, 
educational messages through entertainment narrative, first emerged in Latin America in the 
late 1960s. The Peruvian telenovela, Simplemente Maria, featured the success story of a 
female migrant who worked hard during daytime and enrolled in literacy classes at night to 
eventually become a prominent fashion designer. Besides its high audience ratings, the 
telenovela prompted a surge in domestic workers’ enrollment in adult literacy classes. To 
understand the reason behind its success, Mexican producer Miguel Sabido then dissected the 
telenovela and developed a framework for E-E production that has inspired other projects 
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  Sabido’s E-E approach hinges upon social psychology, and more specifically Albert 
Bandura’s social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1977, 1986). Bandura posits that people learn by 
observing models perform behaviors in their social milieu and by reflecting on the outcome of 
the models’ actions. Rewards for and the attractiveness of the model are thus key factors that 
can enhance the reproduction of the behaviour (Greenberg et al., 2004). The character’s 
similarity to the viewer further enhances their persuasive power and enhances the audience’s 
sense of efficacy (Bandura, 2004). Moving beyond social interactions, E-E introduces similar 
models of behavior in media narratives through three main character types: positive role 
models, negative role models, and transitional characters (Singhal et al., 1995; Singhal & 
Rogers, 2001). The storyline narratively embodies rewards for the positive role model who 
adopts or supports the promoted behavior and punishments for the negative role model who 
rejects it. The transitional character typically receives rewards in the plotline as well for 
eventually switching from a negative to a positive role model. Portraying those characters, E-
E narratives have proven successful in spreading awareness, changing attitudes, and/or 
altering behaviors when it comes to health- and gender-related issues (Bouman, 2004; Hether 
et al., 2008; Sood & Rogers, 2000; Vaughan & Rogers, 2000).  
 Narrative persuasion in and of itself is not new to the study of anti-extremism 
messaging. In fact, scholars contemplated the value of E-E television programming in 
countering terrorism long ago (Singhal et al., 2004; Storey & Sood, 2013), but the E-E 
framework remains understudied. Whether perceived as alternative narratives, counter-
narratives, or strategic communication campaigns (Briggs & Feve, 2013; Ferguson, 2016), 
many anti-extremism media projects in Western Europe and North America do exhibit E-E 
features, ranging from the use of theater, animation and rap songs for educational purposes to 
the fictional portrayals of positive and negative role models to dissuade youth from joining 
violent groups (Colliver & Davey, 2017; Mazza et al., 2017; Payne, 2017; Vidino & Brandon, 
2012). As most of these efforts circulate online, views, shares, comments, likes, and dislikes 
usually serve as the metrics to gauge audience response to such projects (Davies et al., 2016; 
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In the Arab world, where TV and film producers have developed anti-extremism 
narratives for years, tracking audience response has been more challenging. Social and 
political pressures can often bring an early end to such projects. Take, for example, The Road 
to Kabul TV series that Arab channels had pulled off air in 2004 after eight of 30 episodes. 
The media cited multiple reasons for the show’s termination, including terrorist threats against 
the crew and pressure from the United States (“‘The Road to Kabul’ leads MBC and the Arab 
Center to Court,” 2011). The ties between research firms and corporate and government actors 
in the region introduce another layer of complexity that tends to restrain transparent 
assessments of audience response (Jaber & Kraidy, 2020). Despite the pervasiveness of social 
media today, the lack of full project availability online and/or restrictions on comment posting 
can also hinder research. For example, upon airing the anti-ISIS TV drama Gharabeeb Soud 
(Black Crows) in 2017, the pan-Arab broadcaster MBC group uploaded only the first episode 
to YouTube. But even then, it had disabled viewer comments altogether, thus curtailing 
potential audience analyses online.  
Jaber and Kraidy offer a useful starting point not only by exploring the reception of 
Gharabeeb Soud, but also by approaching the project through the lens of E-E (Jaber & 
Kraidy, 2020). Departing from previous studies that had examined the tropes in and counter-
messaging value of the show (Khader, 2017; Navarro, 2019), they instead employ a close 
reading of the plot and characters. In doing so, they identify MBC’s E-E strategy and the 
application of Sabido’s framework in the show with the use of a narrator and the development 
of positive and negative role models. Jaber and Kraidy then apply discourse analysis to 
investigate online debates around the show, the media’s coverage, and MBC’s statements. 
Yet, they explain that their approach, despite insightful, “tells an incomplete story about GS’s 
[Gharabeeb Soud] audience reception” (Jaber & Kraidy, 2020, p. 1878). This study expands 
on their work by examining the nature of viewers’ interactions with fictional characters in 
anti-extremism messaging, using a more recent case study, al-Siham al-Marika TV drama. 
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June 2019 offers a unique opportunity for an in-depth, systematic analysis of audience’s 
immediate responses to the show in the comments section. 
 
Parasocial Interaction (PSI) 
 
The parasocial experience is a key construct in entertainment audience reception research. 
Building on Allport’s Intergroup Contact Theory (Allport, 1954), which maintains that 
interpersonal communication can reduce prejudice, Horton and Wohl coined the phrase 
“parasocial interaction” in reference to “the illusion of face-to-face relationship” with 
mediated characters (Horton & Wohl 1956, p. 215). Similar to interpersonal interaction, the 
one-sided, pseudo friendship with fictional characters can generate positive responses 
amongst viewers, change attitudes, and alter beliefs (Schiappa et al., 2005). However, 
previous scholarship emphasizes that PSI can also occur with disliked characters, prompting 
rejection of the mediated persona and negative attitudes toward their behaviors (Dibble & 
Raen, 2011; Giles, 2002; Klimmt et al., 2006; Rihl & Wegener, 2019). Hence, parasocial 
experience entails friendship with or animosity towards fictional characters in the same 
fashion as interpersonal interactions. Repeated PSI can further evolve into parasocial 
relationships that facilitate the reproduction of favored characters’ behaviors (Cohen, 2003; 
Ortiz & Brooks, 2014).  
 The existing scholarship reveals new trends in analyzing PSI. For decades, surveys 
and experiments have made up the bulk of PSI research, often using a range of scales that 
have emerged since the introduction of the concept in the 1950s (Auter & Palmgreen, 2000; 
Powell et al., 2012; Rubin & Perse, 1987; Schramm & Hartmann, 2008; Tukachinsky, 2010). 
Together, such studies point to PSI’s role in influencing political views and decisions 
(Centeno, 2010; Wen & Cui, 2014), attitudes about race and gender (Hoffner & Cohen, 2015; 
Kistler & Lee, 2009), trust (Sherman-Morris, 2005), purchasing behaviors (Colliander & 
Erlandsson, 2015), and willingness to donate (Lee et al., 2010). In recent years, the emergence 
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of tweets, comments, and posts have risen (Liebers & Schramm, 2019). Such research 
investigates how internet users express PSI with celebrities, media personalities and fictional 
characters (DeGroot & Leith, 2018; Gregg, 2018; Kim et al., 2016; Kopacz & Lawton, 2013; 
Sanderson & Hope Cheong, 2010; Van den Bulck, 2019; Van Den Bulck & Claessens, 2014). 
Although previous work does examine PSI in the context of E-E (Lee et al., 2010; 
Sood & Rogers, 2000), none have investigated the construct in anti-extremism messaging. In 
fact, Braddock and Horgan’s (2016) guide for constructing counter-terrorism narratives calls 
for the exploration of PSI as a persuasive strategy that can “make the audience more 
sympathetic to those [protagonist] characters, thereby undermining the terrorist group’s 
justifications for their actions” (Braddock, 2020, p. 92). This study takes a step in that 
direction by examining viewers’ PSI with the fictional characters in an anti-extremism TV 
series.  
 Two research questions guide this study’s methodological approach and analysis: 
(1) How do viewers respond to anti-extremism entertainment-education projects? 





This study examines the 8,615 comments available online in response to the 30 episodes of 
al-Siham al-Marika TV drama distributed on YouTube through 2019.2 The focus on this TV 
series stems from its unique approach as compared with previous anti-extremism projects. 
First, the idea for al-Siham al-Marika came from co-producer Moez Masoud, a young and 
prominent Muslim televangelist who has created multiple TV shows about Islam over the past 
decade. His role introduces a layer of religiosity and education to this anti-ISIS narrative. 
 
2 The author used the Export Comments third party scrapping tool (exportcomments.com) to retrieve all viewers’ 
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Second, the TV drama neither involves direct government sponsorship nor collaborations with 
foreign producers, which mitigates audience suspicions about the project’s intent. Third, the 
pan-Arab crew, bringing together Egyptian, Tunisian, Iraqi, Syrian, and Lebanese artists, 
expands the show’s appeal more broadly in the region. Lastly, the availability of all al-Siham 
al-Marika’s episodes on YouTube after it aired on Emirati and Egyptian television stations in 
2018-2019 has also boosted the show’s viewership (11.5+ million views on YouTube by May 
2020) and, most importantly, facilitates analyses of audience response in the comments 
section.   
To assess the audience response to the show, this study adopts a mix of methods. To 
gauge how Arab viewers reacted to the show, the study employed a Straussian approach to 
grounded theory, which involves open coding of the data and the inductive development of 
conceptual categories (Bernabo, 2019; Grbich, 2007). The qualitative content analysis yielded 
thematic groupings that account for recurring patterns across the pool of comments. To 
explore whether Arab viewers developed PSI with the characters in al-Siham al-Marika, one 
coder, who is a native Arabic speaker and fluent in English read each of the 8,615 comments 
to identify indicators of parasocial experience (Yes/No). Borrowing from previous PSI 
content analyses (Sood & Rogers, 2000; Van den Bulck, 2019; Van Den Bulck & Claessens, 
2014), comments that described the fictional character as part of the viewer’s social reality, 
used direct address to a named character in the plotline, and treated the character as an 
acquaintance, friend, relative, or enemy of the individual posting the comment were coded as 
exhibiting PSI. A close reading of all 30 episodes, including an identification of the plot and 
various character types, further complemented the PSI analysis.   
 
Themes in Audience Comments 
 
Al-Siham al-Marika features role models and transitional characters in the plot to convey an 
anti-extremism, educational message (see Table 1). The story takes place in an unidentified 
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who, despite living under the group’s control, distinguish ISIS from Islam, reject extremist 
ideologies, and preserve their Muslim identity. The characters who serve as positive role 
models either secretly hold on to their beliefs until they are able to escape or join the 
resistance movement to fight against ISIS and eventually meet a deadly, yet honorable and 
heroic, fate. The negative role models are ISIS members and leaders who outwardly appear 
religious, but manipulate sacred texts to justify their heinous crimes: rapes, enslaving women, 
theft, torture, and the murder of civilians. In some instances, the punishments for negative role 
models are explicit, such as the individuals suffering serious injuries or committing suicide 
out of despair. In others, the narrative prophesies that an imminent bad ending awaits ISIS 
leaders by showing more civilians and militants turning against them eventually. Meanwhile, 
transitional characters are initially extremists who exhibit a firm belief in ISIS’s ideology and 
act upon it. Over time, however, they realize the group’s deviance, and denounce extremism, 
repent for their crimes, and restore their faith. Transforming into positive role models, 
transitional characters rectify their ways by raising their kids to ensure a better future and/or 
by achieving martyrdom status in their fight against ISIS. 
In response to that narrative, the full array of YouTube comments across the 30 
episodes fall into six main categories: show debates, religious contestations, political disputes, 
empathy for victims, engagement with plotline/characters, and unrelated/unclear (see Figure 
1). Despite making up the most recurring category, the unrelated/unclear comments do not 
address the show, the conflict, or any other relevant issues. Instead, they involve promotions 
of other YouTube channels, views about competing TV dramas, generic prayers, random 
questions, and personal attacks. The remaining five categories, which together constitute 70 
percent of the comments, highlight numerous aspects of the TV series, the geopolitical 
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Sherif Positive A broadcast journalist that ISIS kidnaps while he reports from Northern 
Syria. Separated from his wife and daughter, Sherif fakes his support to 
ISIS as he searches for his family. Under pressure, he marries Umm 
Ubai, an ISIS female leader, but secretly joins the resistance movement. 
Despite finding and escaping with his family, he returns to save his 
stepson from ISIS. Wearing an orange jumpsuit in his final moments, 
Sherif publicly chants against ISIS, pronounces shahada (the Islamic 
testament of faith), and faces his death with a big smile.  
Habiba Positive A female schoolteacher who allows her students to perform arts, despite 
ISIS’s prohibitions. Married to Ammar, a top ISIS leader, Habiba 
continuously challenges his beliefs in hopes that he would denounce 
extremism. When Ammar learns about Habiba’s links to the resistance 
movement, he takes part in her arrest. Like Sherif, Habiba pronounces 
shahada in her final moments as she courageously faces death. 
Talha Negative An ISIS member whose sexual desires prompt his decision to join the 
group. Not only does Talha marry four women, but he also buys female 
slaves. Blindly following ISIS’s orders, he beheads prisoners, betrays 
his best friend, and participates in battles. Talha loses a leg and suffers 
sexual dysfunction as a result of a bombing, after which he shoots 
himself in the head at the slave market. 
Abu Anas Negative A top ISIS leader who plans and commits numerous crimes, such as 
targeting Shiite worshippers in a mosque, torturing kids, beheading 
prisoners, and enslaving numerous women. Abu Anas eventually 
succeeds in capturing members of the resistance, but his militants start 
defecting and the civilians begin to revolt. 
Ammar Transitional A top ISIS leader who attacks villages and kills civilians. After 
contributing to his wife’s arrest and execution, Ammar develops PTSD 
and goes through an internal moral struggle, culminating in his 
defection. He further leads the resistance movement until his arrest. In 
his final moments, Ammar challenges the ISIS Emir, calls on the 
crowds to resist, describes death in the fight against ISIS as martyrdom, 
and dies with a smile on his face. 
Umm Ubai Transitional A female ISIS leader put in charge of new abductees, whom she 
manipulates to support extremist ideologies. Umm Ubai prohibits her 
son from drawing and excommunicates her new husband Sherif for 
disagreeing with ISIS. As Sherif continues to challenge her beliefs, she 
aborts her suicide operation targeting the inside of a Shiite mosque. But 
when he sacrifices his life for her son Ubai, she eventually denounces 
extremism, supports the resistance, and apologizes to her son for the 
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Figure 1. Audience response to al-Siham al-Marika episodes in the YouTube comments 
 
 
Engagement with Plotline/Characters 
Making up over a quarter of the comments, engagement with plotline/characters is the 
second most recurrent theme in the audience responses after those unrelated to the show. 
Viewers share their feelings, views, and questions about events that had unfolded and about 
characters who had appeared over the course of 30 episodes. Commenting on episode four 
that portrays the selling of non-Muslim women on the streets, for example, one viewer 
wonders, “is it true that a slave market is present in the areas under Daesh’s [ISIS’s] control?” 
(Al Nahar Drama, 2019c) Watching ISIS militants capture and torture one of the members of 
the resistance movement leading up to his death in episode 25, another viewer voices the pain 
she feels and further expresses her grief, using broken heart and weeping emojis in the 
comment. As the story progresses, the number of those comments almost triples from an 
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half. The crafting of a 17-hour, anti-extremism drama thus succeeded in engaging some 
audience members with the story.  
 
Show Debates 
Debates around the show comprise about another quarter of the comments. The vast 
majority of the debate postings (83 percent) favor al-Siham al-Marika, sometimes even 
deeming it as worthy of Oscar awards and honorary PhDs, due to its good acting, effective 
directing, nuanced scriptwriting, realistic storyline, and overarching educational message. For 
example, a comment on the first episode describes the show as a source of enlightenment, as 
it reveals “the truth about Daesh to the weak minds whom they [Daesh] can control under the 
pretext of Islam” (Al Nahar Drama, 2019a). The remaining comments either criticize the 
show for production issues (e.g., bad lighting, low audio, unconvincing acting, and 
exaggerated scenes) or perceive it as a malicious propaganda tool against Islam. Displaying 
suspicions about the show’s true motive, a viewer comments on episode 16: 
Unfortunately, [it’s] a failing TV series that deforms Islam…The Arab media is 
always a failure, fabricating and distorting truths, as if the Western media is not 
enough, particularly the American cinema that has destroyed the image of Islam in the 
world. And now, Arab [media] projects are helping with that, by making things worse 
(Al Nahar Drama, 2019i). 
Although negative comments compete with and, at one point, outnumber positive postings in 
response to the show’s early episodes, they gradually start to fade away in response to the 
fourth episode onward, leading up to the peak of viewers’ praise by the final episode. The 
level of commitment involved in viewing anti-extremism narratives over many episodes likely 
catalyzes positive perceptions over time.  
 
Religious Contestations 
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majority of those postings are either inflammatory attacks against or defenses of Islam (see 
Figure 2). The derogatory comments equate Islam with ISIS, describe it as a barbaric 
ideology, and ridicule Prophet Muhammad. At the same time, more than 150 unique viewers 
exhibit pride in their choice to become a Muslim and underscore the show’s message that 
extremists co-opt, manipulate, and misinterpret the true Islamic faith. A closer look at the 
pejorative remarks against Islam, however, reveals that almost three-fourths come from only 
eight YouTube accounts, with a single user accounting for more than one-third of the 
comments. In some instances, the attacks shift to Christianity, including discussion of 
excommunicating its followers, describing it as a violent religion, and citing excerpts from the 
Bible. Yet again, two-thirds of those remarks come from only seven users. The unregulated 
comment sections on anti-extremism narratives can thus attract trollers capable of deflecting 
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Making up eight percent of the comments, the political disputes theme conveys clear 
articulations of the conflict between extremists and the state(s). In line with the show’s 
narrative, the majority of the postings generally attack extremists, often singling out ISIS 
members as terrorists, murderers, rapists, hypocrites, colluders, and, more importantly, as 
khawarij,3 or renegades. Commenting on the ninth episode, for example, a viewer exclaims, 
 
3 Khawarij comes from the Arabic root kha ra ja, which means to exit. Applied in the Islamic context, it refers to 
a group of seventh century political dissidents who revolted against and excommunicated fourth Caliph and 
Prophet Muhammad’s cousin Ali ibn Abi Talib, who fought them back. A number of hadiths (prophetic sayings) 
predict their emergence, deem them as individuals who exit from the folds of Islam, and call on Muslims to fight 
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“this is not religion, it is manipulation of religion. Indeed, they are khawarij” (Al Nahar 
Drama, 2019e). Another user passionately comments on episode 14, “may God curse the 
khawarij of this age, the dogs of hellfire,” before citing religious texts that further condemn 
ISIS’s actions (Al Nahar Drama, 2019g). While the show itself refrains from any portrayal of 
Arab states’ counterterrorism efforts, some users nonetheless express pride in their national 
identity and support of their states (e.g., Iraq, Morocco, and Egypt) for fighting extremists and 
restoring order. Barely one hundred comments praise ISIS and/or attacks existing states. 
Those postings encapsulate support for the establishment of a caliphate and blame Israel, 
western nations, Iran, Turkey, Qatar and other Arab states for conspiring against Islam. For 
example, a comment responding to the second episode claims, “most Arab nations are in 
alliance with the West to distort the image of Islam” (Al Nahar Drama, 2019b). Despite the 
minimal expressions of support to ISIS against state actors, al-Siham al-Marika seemed 
successful in narrativizing religiopolitical labels like khawarij that viewers would adopt in 
denouncing extremists.  
 
Empathy for Victims 
With only one hundred related comments, empathy for victims is the least recurring 
theme in the audience’s response. Watching portrayals of ISIS’s oppression in al-Siham al-
Marika episodes, some viewers share prayers and express emotional support for those who 
have lived under the group’s control in Iraq and Syria. Posting in response to the second 
episode, a viewer asks that “God helps those who endured this oppressive reality” (Al Nahar 
Drama, 2019b). Other users also comfort Iraqi and Syrian nationals who share their individual 
experiences in the online comments. One Syrian viewer, for example, recounts how the brutal 
conditions in Aleppo had forced him out of his hometown, prompting another to post her 
prayers from Egypt that God would help him along with all Syrians against their enemies. Just 
 
Muhammad’s description of the khawarij in the title, invoke the label throughout the script, and visualize it on 
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as the fictional anti-extremism narrative drew trollers to the comments section, it also created 
a sense of solidarity amongst sympathetic viewers in the Arab world. 
 
PSI with Characters 
 
One in every 6 comments exhibits PSI with al-Siham al-Marika characters. Most of the PSI 
comments appear in the engagement with plotline/characters theme regardless the viewer’s 
sex. Yet, female users are more likely than males to exhibit PSI with fictional characters in 
the show (20 versus 13 percent respectively).4 The viewers communicate about or with the 
mediated personas in this anti-extremism narrative as if they are part of their social network. 
Three-quarters of the time, they also address the show’s characters by their fictional names. 
As the story progresses over 30 episodes, the PSI increases exponentially from an average of 
17 comments per episode in the first ten to an average of 43 in the second ten, to a peak of 88 
in the final ten (see Figure 3). The viewers of al-Siham al-Marika episodes appear to not only 
interact with the characters, but to also develop such one-sided relationships with them 
incrementally. The nature of such relationships, however, differ according to the character 










 After excluding all comments coming from users that were ambiguous in terms of sex, a chi-square test of 
independence revealed a significant difference in female and male’s expressions of PSI in the comments, χ2 (1, 
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Figure 3. Expressions of PSI with characters in al-Siham al-Marika across the 30 





Positive Role Models 
Through their initial interactions with the positive role model Habiba, many viewers 
come to perceive her as an acquaintance. The series introduce Habiba (played by Lebanese 
actress Diamand Bou Aboud) as a teacher who deeply cares for her daughter and students as 
well as genuinely loves her husband Ammar, despite him serving as a top ISIS leader. 
Gradually, the audience learns that even though Habiba appears to adhere to ISIS restrictions 
on movement, clothing, and art performance, she does not actually share their views. For 
example, in episodes 5 and 6, Habiba comforts a student who lost his dad by secretly handing 
him a Mickey Mouse drawing to facilitate the practice of his painting hobby, reveals that the 
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prepares an anti-ISIS graffiti that carries the words, “Down the Khawarij,” challenges 
Ammar’s extremist ideology, and lovingly expresses her willingness to move with him away 
from ISIS-controlled territory. In response, YouTube commenters blur the line between 
reality and drama by using Habiba’s fictional name. They share their positive feelings toward 
her through a mix of words and heart emojis, praise her actions, and describe her, at times, as 
“the best of them all” (Al Nahar Drama, 2019d). 
But when ISIS arrests Habiba in episode 13 and subsequently beheads her, the PSI 
intensifies by moving toward friendship. Prior to her execution, one viewer comments, “Oh 
God, I don’t want them to kill Habiba. If they do, I will be deeply saddened” (Al Nahar 
Drama, 2019f). As she faces death in strong faith and courage in episode 14, the expressions 
of PSI reach their highest point since the beginning of the show. Many of those posting 
comments state how they cried for her, express their pain using broken heart and teary emojis, 
and blame ISIS for killing her. Even after her death, YouTube users continue to interact with 
her in the comments. They talk about how much they miss her and reminisce about her 
actions. A comment on episode 19 illustrates the heightened level of engagement: 
 
Habiba is wrong, she shouldn’t have done anything. She should have remained silent 
because they are in a tough situation and the work of the resistance will not be useful. 
They [ISIS] are monsters who know no reason, only killing. The resistance fell in the 
hands of those who don’t fear God, but He is the one who has the solution and He is 
the one who will help them. Habiba died and left her daughter behind in this cruel 
world (Al Nahar Drama, 2019k). 
 
Building the character’s story arc over time and invoking a dramatic event as the climax can 
thus facilitate the occurrence and development of PSI in anti-extremism E-E projects.  
The interactions with another key positive role model are much more complex. The 
show introduces Sherif (played by Egyptian actor Hany Adel) as a Muslim man who pretends 














ISSN: 2363-9849          
of being deployed to the border so that he can then search for his wife and daughter. In the 
show’s initial setup of his character, the audience interact with Sherif as a good acquaintance. 
They sympathize with him for the struggle he is going through, praise him for refusing to 
have sex with an ISIS female leader he was forced to marry, and even express willingness to 
meet him in person. For some viewers, however, a few events complicate their virtual 
relationship with Sherif. In episodes 15 and 16, Sherif finds out his first wife and daughter are 
on display in the slave market and successfully buys his daughter but fails to purchase his 
wife after the top ISIS leader Abu Anas enslaved her. Sherif’s unsuccessful attempts to 
convince Abu Anas to let her go spur a debate amongst the audience, prompting a notable 
increase in PSI in response to episode 16. Some commenters label Sherif a coward and weak 
for allowing someone to enslave his wife, while others remain supportive by offering sincere 
advice as to how he could resolve the situation. PSI reaches another high point in episode 22 
when Sherif reports to Abu Anas about Ammar (an ISIS leader who turns against the group, 
secretly leads the resistance movement, and asks Sherif to join him) out of fear it may be a 
trap. Some viewers then angrily turn against Sherif, voicing their contempt and labeling him 
as selfish, filthy, stupid, traitor, low, and son of a dog, with some even threatening to “put a 
bullet in his head” for putting Ammar in danger (Al Nahar Drama, 2019l). 
But as with Habiba, Sherif gradually becomes a friend to many viewers as he faces 
immense danger. In episode 27, Sherif eventually escapes with his family from ISIS-
controlled lands, after which he learns that the paintings he gave to his 10-year-old stepson 
has put the young boy in jail. In response, YouTube users express their worries and fears 
about Sherif. One viewer, for example, prays that he doesn’t go back and asks for somebody 
to call him; and another comments, “I will die if they execute Sherif” (Al Nahar Drama, 
2019m). Indeed, episode 28 signals the peak of PSI throughout the entire show, as it portrays 
Sherif’s return in an effort to save his stepson, his defiance against ISIS leaders, and his 
declaration of faith right before dying. Many viewers then share their prayers and their 
feelings of pain, sorrow, and depression, often addressing Sherif directly. For example, a 
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a hero. You could have said it’s not my business and escaped with your wife and daughter, 
but really you are a great human being” (Al Nahar Drama, 2019n). Avoiding the idealization 
of positive role models in anti-extremism narratives by revealing flaws and bad decisions 
presents more realistic characters with whom viewers can interact parasocially.  
 
Negative Role Models 
Unlike the pseudo friendships with Habiba and Sherif, the PSI with negative role 
models evolve from the level of acquaintance to enmity. Al-Siham al-Marika presents Talha 
(played by Egyptian actor Walid Fawaz) and Abu Anas (played by Iraqi actor Kamel Ibrahim) 
as representatives of ISIS who carried out atrocities and manipulation of religion. The two 
characters follow their sexual desires by marrying and enslaving numerous women, commit 
heinous crimes of torture and prisoner execution, and justify their actions citing religious 
texts. In response, viewers’ initial interactions with Talha and Abu Anas express 
discontentment and disapproval, often describing the two as insane, lustful, and psychopathic. 
As the characters continue to progress along the path of extremism without repentance in the 
later episodes, the PSI strengthens. Comments begin to convey hatred and detestation, to call 
for retribution by beheading, burning, and blowing up, and to utilize more negative labels, 
such as animals, dogs, trash, hypocrites, devils, and even infidels. In the final episode, Talha 
commits suicide after severing the head of his best friend, reporting members of the 
resistance, and losing hope in regaining his sexual ability. A YouTube user directly censures 
him, saying “You lived a traitor and died an infidel O you filthy, womanizer Talha [sic]” (Al 
Nahar Drama, 2019o). In a similar fashion, when Abu Anas oversees the beheading of Sherif 
in episode 28, a viewer remarks, “who can bring me Abu Anas and I will sever his head like 
he does to people” (Al Nahar Drama, 2019n). Hence, narrativizing the acts of extremists can 
not only elicit support for punishment of those who misappropriate the faith to commit bad 
acts, but it can also result in a heightened willingness to take retaliatory action.  
 Nonetheless, the attractiveness of some negative role models moderates the parasocial 
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models, Talha is initially attractive to some of the YouTube audience compared to Abu Anas 
who constantly appeared as the heartless villain throughout the 30 episodes. Viewers’ 
postings reflect some affinity with Talha in earlier episodes, describing him as funny, 
repeating a few of his punchlines, and using laughing emojis when talking about or to him. 
Some even sympathize with Talha when he loses his leg in episode 14, despite acknowledging 
his crimes and abusive behavior. Over time, feelings of enmity displace sympathy toward 
Talha in the comments. While the depiction of an attractive negative role model can lessen 
parasocial enmity, it cannot eradicate it if the plot does not show a reversal in the character’s 
course of action.  
 
Transitional Characters 
In the show’s early episodes, transitional characters prompt a similar level of 
parasocial animosity as the negative role models. Ammar (played by Egyptian actor Sherif 
Salama) and Umm Ubai (played by Tunisian actress Aicha Ben Ahmed) appear as ISIS 
leaders who wholeheartedly adhere to extremist ideology. They sanction crimes to further the 
group’s cause, but eventually reconsider their interpretation of faith, struggle to justify their 
own actions, and repent. During Ammar and Umm Ubai’s time as negative role models, the 
viewers denounce their actions and call for their punishment. Posts describe them as 
coldblooded enemies of God, criminals, and terrorists whom ISIS has brainwashed. Watching 
Umm Ubai pressure female abductees to either convert to Islam or become fodder for the 
slave market in episode 15, a commenter exclaims, “Umm Ubai is despicable, I wish they 
would behead her,” while another remarks, “I hate Umm Ubai” (Al Nahar Drama, 2019h). 
Meanwhile, witnessing Ammar’s pain after playing a role in arresting and beheading his wife 
Habiba, a viewer addresses him passionately: 
 
Only now you feel the heartache when the closest person to you loses her life in front 
of your eyes and you live with that burn inside of you. You were killing people and 
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they are animals and separating between men, women, and children. God is now 
avenging you, punishing you, and letting you feel the burn inside your heart [sic] (Al 
Nahar Drama, 2019k). 
 
Yet, the attractiveness of the transitional characters prepares the audience for a shift in 
PSI. Ammar and Umm Ubai are both young, good-looking characters in love with their 
spouses, who are positive role models. As Ammar struggles after Habiba’s death and seeks 
psychiatric help, some viewers show compassion and express appreciation for the deep 
feelings he holds for his late wife. For example, one viewer notes, “I cannot hate Ammar, his 
heart is full of love and he is being tortured” (Al Nahar Drama, 2019k). Umm Ubai also 
shows her love for her husband Sherif by helping set his first wife free after her enslavement. 
Seeing her efforts culminate in Sherif’s reunion with his wife in episode 18, some 
commenters reconsider their perceptions of Umm Ubai and send her flower emojis and virtual 
hugs. One viewer applauds her, saying “Umm Ubai, now that you are showing compassion 
and acting like a human being rather than a robot, you are able to do the right and humane 
thing” (Al Nahar Drama, 2019j). The show’s portrayal of the romantic side of extremist 
characters thus stimulated the audience to consider their forgiveness.  
But character transformations appear to drive the actual shift in the nature of expressed 
PSI in viewer comments. In episode 20, for example, Ammar finally admits he was wrong 
and denounces extremism. The following episodes emphasize his repentance by showing his 
abandonment of extreme interpretations of Islam, his decision to lovingly raise his daughter, 
his leadership of the resistance movement, and his clandestine fight against ISIS. Viewers 
swiftly take Ammar’s side in response. They welcome his transition, pray for him, provide 
advice for him, and express concern for his safety. When Ammar sacrifices his own life to 
save his brother by turning himself in to ISIS in the final episode, commenters eulogize him 
as a martyr and applaud his heroism. One viewer, for example, repeats Ammar’s last words 
and stresses their continuity after his death, saying “Indeed, as Ammar mentioned, resistance 
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suicide attack inside a Shiite mosque in episode 27, signaling a shift away from extremism. 
She subsequently tells Sherif she loves him immediately before he dies, joins the crowd in 
defying ISIS’s restrictions on music, and apologizes to her son for the way she previously 
raised him. Subsequently, viewers begin to voice their support to Umm Ubai, praising her 
transformation and praying she reunites with Sherif in heaven. Hence, incrementally 
humanizing defectors in anti-extremism narratives can potentially elicit support for their 




The audience response to al-Siham al-Marika demonstrates that E-E can be an effective 
messaging strategy to counter extremism. First, the viewers’ engagement with the plot and 
characters in over 2,400 comments conveys the inherent ability of visual storytelling to 
overcome audience resistance to the message, particularly among female viewers. Other 
modes, such as testimonials of former terrorists, interviews with victims, statements by 
religious authority figures delegitimizing extremists, or social marketing campaigns against 
violence may lack the same potential for identification and persuasive potency of the 
entertainment narrative. Second, the show’s plot and characters spur extensive online debates 
where the audience discuss religion, politics, and format of popular culture, often 
incorporating recurrent and complex religio-political constructs. In this case, the majority of 
postings align with the show’s message, but regardless, the story simplifies key points of 
contention with the extremists’ messaging. Third, the professional implementation of the E-E 
framework can amplify anti-extremism narratives. With the involvement of celebrities, the 
invocation of positive, negative, and transitional characters, the entertainment value of the 
story, and the show’s release during the popular Ramadan season, al-Siham al-Marika 
episodes reached over 11 million viewers on YouTube alone, a number far surpassing that of 
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individuals already engaged in violent action, they hold great promise for mitigating cognitive 
extremism at the societal level. 
In addition, TV drama can be a promising format for anti-extremism E-E productions. 
Breaking down the story into episodes can generate anticipation, commitment, and 
familiarity. In fact, this study’s findings show that the audience’s level of engagement with 
the plot increases as the story progresses, while objections to the overarching message 
decreases over time. Spreading the narrative of the series over several hours further creates 
opportunities for nuanced story arcs for the main characters. In al-Siham al-Marika, for 
example, positive role models, like Sherif, can make bad decisions, while negative role 
models, like Talha or Ammar in earlier episodes, can appear funny or romantic despite their 
heinous crimes. As the viewers become more familiar with the characters and perceive them 
as somewhat similar in terms of religion, country of origin, ethnicity, appearance, and dialect, 
the tendency to blur the line between reality and fiction increases, with some later episodes 
prompting over 90 expressions of PSI. Moreover, the repeated exposure to the characters and 
their complex personalities, vulnerabilities, and struggles opens cleavages for PSI to evolve 
from acquaintance levels to those of friendship or enmity. Moving beyond the superficial 
depictions of extremists as evil and those fighting them as heaven sent, E-E dramas can thus 
showcase more realistic characters that can, in turn, enhance the potential for persuasion to 
occur.  
 The study also reveals the methodological potential of PSI in assessing audience 
response to anti-extremism E-E projects. Sampling individuals who are vulnerable to or 
supportive of extremist groups introduces various ethical and methodological challenges. 
Respondents may feel racially, ethnically, or religiously stigmatized when questioned about 
extremism or they may turn away or be less than honest due to fears of law enforcement 
(Cottee & Cunliffe, 2018; Moyer-Gusé et al., 2012; Nilsson, 2018). Examining PSI in user 
posts, by contrast, helps gauge immediate reactions to and interactions with characters on the 
screen. Respondents have distance and some anonymity through online posts that limits the 
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not all viewers express themselves in online comments, PSI can still offer a useful starting 
point to evaluate the import, reaction, and reach of anti-extremism narratives.  
PSI further yields valuable insights into elevating audience response studies in the 
violent extremism context. Over the course of the episodes, many al-Siham al-Marika viewers 
increasingly express their affinity to and admiration for characters who hold on to their faith 
and resist extremist ideologies. They also voice their condemnation of those who accept ISIS 
orthodoxy without showing any signs of remorse. Building on previous research that 
emphasizes PSI’s role in shaping attitudes about race, gender, health, and politics (Centeno, 
2010; Hoffner & Cohen, 2015; Kistler & Lee, 2009), anti-extremism narratives that elicit 
pseudo-friendships and/or animosity with mediated personas has the potential to influence the 
audience’s views on extremism as well. This study’s findings, for example, point to viewers’ 
emotional connectedness to fictional characters like Ammar and Umm Ubai once they defect 
and denounce extremism. This level of parasocial relationship with transitional characters, if 
amplified, could help the evolution of public opinion in ways needed to address the current 
rejection of former extremists and their children’s repatriation to home countries (“Les 
Français approuvent massivement le jugement des djihadistes par l’Irak et ne veulent pas voir 
leurs enfants revenir,” 2019; Vinopal, 2019). Similarly, expressions of parasocial enmity to 
negative role models in al-Siham al-Marika display willingness to take retaliatory action, 
which might be channeled toward initiatives combating extremism, building capacity of local 
communities, collecting donations, and providing social services to victims. In short, the 
incorporation of PSI analyses in the monitoring and evaluation of anti-extremism messaging 
can expand existing social media metrics, such as views, likes, shares, and retweets.  
 
Study Limitations 
Finally, the limitations of this study can be of benefit to future research. First, the 
quantitative investigation of parasocial occurrence depends on one coder, which, despite the 
coder’s familiarity with the language and culture, can still compromise the reliability of the 
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reliability tests that solidify the analysis. Second, the study captures PSI in a small subset of 
viewers who post their comments on the episodes. But those viewers may or may not be 
among the main group whom the anti-extremism initiative aims to target. To alleviate this 
issue, future studies can complement content analyses with surveys that unveil more about the 
individual viewer, while using PSI scales to explore engagement in larger samples and 
exploring other constructs in narrative persuasion, such as perceived similarity and 
transportation. Third, the study shows that PSI often peaked in response to dramatic events 
that relate to loss of life in the storyline. While the study notes that pattern, it does not offer an 
in-depth analysis of the audience’s grieving process. Hence, parasocial grief, which is a more 
recent concept in audience reception literature, can be another useful lens that researchers 
may apply to evaluate the persuasive potency of death portrayals in anti-extremism 
messaging. Moreover, the study focuses only on Arab audience response to one E-E project 
that depicts Islamist extremism. Further research can explore the reactions to similar projects 
targeting other regions, using different languages, and tackling other strands of extremism, 
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